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Abstract: Since the mid-1990s, Africa has experienced a re-enchantment with the transformative effects of 
investments in ports, roads, railways and, to some extent, airports. This is reflected in where the World Bank and 
the African Development Bank place their money, as well as in the heightened profile of China, which is the 
largest single external investor in infrastructure. This chapter begins by mapping the different regional patterns 
before addressing the specific question of how far spending has been driven by the requirements of the extractive 
industries. Whereas petroleum and diamonds are associated with enclave dynamics and infrastructure that is 
dedicated to extraction – notably pipelines and airports – most mining relies on road and rail that is shared with 
other users. The second part of the chapter addresses the impact of infrastructural spending on state capacity and 
whether it is sustainable in the current economic climate. What is often not appreciated is that African 
governments account for the greatest investments. In effect, this spending comes at the expense of the provision 
of other public goods. The argument is that while the agenda might appear to be set by external actors, African 
governments have been adept at retaining control. Public–private partnerships have been much more limited than 
the World Bank would prefer. Although global logistics companies have played a role in the construction and 
operation of many seaports, African governments have assigned overall control to semi-autonomous port 
authorities, which have shown their capacity to flex their muscles. All of this casts doubt on the contention that 
neoliberal governance involves an attenuation of state sovereignty. 
When it comes to Africa, the capacity of international organizations to champion that which 
they previously disavowed is nothing less than remarkable. At the present time, all the principal 
actors – African governments, corporate investors and the international agencies themselves – 
are fixated upon the transformative potentialities of infrastructure, by which they mostly mean 
‘big infrastructure’. This is intriguing, given that Africa has been through previous iterations 
of much the same thing. During the late 1940s and 1950s, when the modern idea of 
development was born, overwhelming emphasis was placed upon the catalytic effects of 
infrastructure, and to that end unprecedented levels of investment were channelled into the 
construction of ports, roads and railways (Hoyle and Hilling 1970). When the results proved 
disappointing, enthusiasm waned; and when the money dried up in the late 1970s, a steady 
process of attrition ensued. The decline of Africa’s railway systems is merely the most striking 
example of a technology that had come to be regarded as too expensive and unsuited to African 
requirements. A residual scepticism about big infrastructure remained firmly entrenched during 
the heights of structural adjustment. Hence, the Berg Report, for example, devoted an entire 
chapter to agriculture, but a modest ten pages to transport and communications, which were 
subsumed within a chapter entitled ‘Other Productive Sectors’ that bundled together industry, 
mining and energy. It specifically advised caution with respect to ‘large-scale capital-intensive 
projects’ and proposed that the accent should be placed on the maintenance and renewal of 
existing roads (World Bank 1981, 106). World Bank documents today devote most of their 
attention to championing substantial new investments in transport and energy, which are 
regarded as the drivers of economic change. Clearly, there has been nothing less than a 
paradigm shift and this is reflected in the places where international agencies place their 
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money.2 If economic development has become a kind of modern religion, infrastructural 
investment is once again its most potent fetish. 
In this chapter, I set out to do two things. First, I address the question of how far these 
investments are driven by the requirements of the extractive industries. This has a bearing on 
the likely consequences of lower commodity prices for the more ambitious plans to ‘respace’ 
the African continent in the future (Engel and Nugent 2010). In the second section, I consider 
some implications for the institutional capacity of African states and raise the question of 
whether the current patterns are sustainable. 
The big fix: regional variations in infrastructural expenditure patterns 
The re-enchantment with infrastructure arises out of a conjuncture of a number of elements that 
came into play around the start of the millennium. The first is the rediscovery of regional 
integration as a platform on which to build complementarities between African economies 
(Bach 2016). Whereas economic policies after independence tended to mirror each other, and 
to be competitive in their effects, regional integration today aims to create a common market 
for goods produced locally as well as more advantageous conditions for Africa’s integration 
into the global marketplace. This is clearly an imperative for the countries with large mining 
sectors as well as for landlocked states – and all the more so for those that fall into both 
categories, such as Zambia and Niger. But the expectation is that regional integration will also 
grow the market for countries with substantial manufacturing sectors (like Nigeria) or with 
potential for exporting their agricultural surpluses (like Uganda). Within this schema, transport 
corridors are conceived of as the veins and arteries that circulate goods between coastal ports, 
urban markets and mining hubs. The second factor is a decade of sustained economic growth 
underpinned by high primary commodity prices. This led to renewed interest in Africa on the 
part of global corporations, and emboldened African leaders to anticipate a qualitative 
transformation on the back of targeted investments. It is no exaggeration to say that the notion 
of a ‘big push’ (Killick 1978), which was current in development thinking in the early 1960s, 
is back in vogue, if not in name. The third element is the rapid elaboration of new information 
technologies that create the ‘smart’ systems that potentially enable big infrastructure, for 
example at seaports, to be deployed in much more efficient ways. Finally, there is a shift in the 
consensus towards what is sometimes called ‘neoliberal governance’, in which the boundary 
between the public and private domains has become blurred (Ferguson 2006; Chalfin 2010). 
To some extent, this represents a hangover from the era of structural adjustment, but it also 
reflects a curious convergence of governance trends in Europe and the mixture of public and 
private interests in China. Given that the European (EU) and China are amongst the most 
important players in the infrastructural game, this context clearly matters. All of this has 
enabled some of the grander visions to seem credible in areas where state-led development fell 
short in the past. These four trends reinforce each other in multiple ways to the point that they 
can often seem like a single package. However, each of these elements embodies its own 
internal tensions, and to that extent the relationships between them are also inherently unstable. 
It is a recurring theme in policy documents, most notably those produced by the World Bank 
and the African Development Bank (AfDB), that what is holding Africa back is its severe 
infrastructural deficit. A particular emphasis is placed on seaports, which are characterized as 
chronically congested and lacking overall capacity. The problem is attributed to a combination 
of geographical circumstances, especially the scarcity of natural deep-water harbours, and 
historical legacies arising from decades of economic failure. However, it is also attributed to 
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the more heartening reality that in the first decade of the new millennium the volume of trade 
passing through Africa’s ports tripled (African Development Bank 2010, 32). The existing 
seaports were only constructed to handle general cargo and were unable to accommodate the 
latest generation of container ships, the so-called ‘Panamax’ and ‘Post-Panamax’ vessels. Port 
investments across Africa are largely about bridging the gap with other parts of the maritime 
world. 
The cost of transporting goods is commonly said to be the most serious constraint upon Africa’s 
trade with the rest of the globe. The greatest single factor is the amount of time that it takes for 
ships to be turned around. A report from 2005 estimated that the time spent on average in East 
Asian ports amounted to 20 per cent of the total transport time, whereas in Africa this rose to 
as much as 80 per cent (African Development Bank 2010, 48). The ‘dwell time’ in African 
ports ranged from 4 days in Durban and 5 days in Mombasa to 25 days in Tema and 28 days 
in Port Sudan. The costs also varied wildly with Luanda recording an average handling cost of 
$320 per TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit) by comparison with an average of $90 in Mombasa 
and $121 in Durban (African Development Bank 2010, 47). In addition, the neglect of the 
continent’s rail network has meant that it has not always been possible to follow the shortest 
route to the coast. Because more traffic is forced onto the roads as a consequence, this 
contributes to the wider problems of congestion and decay. The fact that most Zambian copper 
can no longer be dispatched along the Tanzania–Zambia railway (instead, it is transported by 
truck to Durban and Dar es Salaam) is considered symptomatic of the wider problem 
(Raballand and Whitworth 2014, 4). In colonial East Africa, an earlier version of the regional 
integration agenda placed overwhelming emphasis on the railway from the port of Mombasa 
to the Uganda border. Today, the Rift Valley Railway carries only 5 per cent of the freight from 
Mombasa’s port, although it is currently in the process of being upgraded (World Bank 2014, 
82). Finally, one should mention the parlous state of some of Africa’s main roads, which 
represent continental ‘highways’ in name only. Along the Abidjan–Lagos Corridor (ALCO), 
for example, only 51 per cent of the roads were classed as ‘good’ in 2010, with 28 per cent 
categorized as ‘fair’ and 21 per cent as ‘poor’. Meanwhile, along the Cotonou–Niamey 
Corridor, as many as 42 per cent of the roads were classed as ‘poor’ (Deen-Swarray et al. 2014, 
45). 
The shifting configuration of financing is based on the premise that the infrastructural deficit 
is beyond the financial capacities of African governments, even when they pool their resources. 
The AfDB has, for example, taken the lead in financing the Trans-African Highway Project, 
which is a priority of the African Union. The World Bank has greatly increased its own 
commitments to transport infrastructure, abandoning the scepticism of the relatively recent 
past. This in part reflects a retreat from the narrowly economistic prescriptions of the structural 
adjustment era, which produced disappointing results across much of Africa. In addition, 
development banks, bilateral donors and the private sector all play important roles. Along any 
given transport corridor, there is typically a multiplicity of projects that bring together different 
combinations of actors, while the usual corporate suspects, such as Bolloré, turn up in several 
locations at once. There is a certain structural logic that favours big infrastructure, for the 
reason that it is often easier for African governments to access external funds to cover large 
investments than to find money for more modest projects. For politicians whose reputations 
rest on their ability to point towards ‘development’, there is an additional incentive to favour 
big infrastructure because it tends to be highly visible. The electoral cycle plays its own part as 
incumbent politicians feel the need to be seen commissioning or championing new projects in 
advance of going to the polls. Regimes may also seek to secure political support by devolving 
some of the work to local contractors. 
Let us now consider the patterns of infrastructural expenditure in more detail before assessing 
the relative importance of the various actors. The Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA), 
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which brings together the G8 countries, the World Bank, the EU, the AfDB and some others, 
publishes an annual report on infrastructural financing. It distinguishes between investments in 
transport, energy, water and information and communications technologies (ICT). In 2013, the 
report revealed that ICA members invested considerably more in energy than transport 
infrastructure, whereas other external investors leaned the other way (Infrastructure 
Consortium for Africa 2014). In 2015, energy and transport accounted for 43.5 per cent and 
34.1 per cent of ICA financing, respectively (Infrastructure Consortium for Africa 2016, 24). 
However, if the investments in energy in South Africa and North Africa are removed from the 
equation, transport comes out ahead across the other regions of Africa. It will come as little 
surprise to learn that China was by the far the largest bilateral investor, accounting for 25 per 
cent of all infrastructural financing in 2015, or that it has specifically targeted transport 
infrastructure. But the data also highlights two other patterns that are worthy of note. First, 
private investment in infrastructure has been unevenly distributed, with a strong bias towards 
energy in South Africa, but it has contributed far less than the ICA and other public investors 
– in fact, a mere 8.9 per cent of the total in 2015 (Infrastructure Consortium for Africa 2016, 
15). Second, African governments finance slightly more than half of the expenditure 
commitments, typically placing their own money into transport rather than energy. In addition, 
African governments incur the obligations that come with external lending. In 2015, as much 
as 72.9 per cent, or $14.25 billion, of ICA funding commitments were in the form of loans, 
whereas grants accounted for only $2.35 billion and ‘blended’ funding a mere $1.10 billion 
(Infrastructure Consortium for Africa 2016, 26). This suggests that African states are far more 
engaged with the infrastructural ‘big push’ than is commonly assumed. 
Table 1.1 Infrastructure commitments by sector and source, 2015 ($ million) 
Source Transport Water Energy ICT Multi- 
sector 
Other Total 
ICA 6,770.9 3,184.3 8,635.0 626.0 634.4 – 19,840.7 
ACG 2,071.7 377.8 1,554.9 16.5 391.5 – 4,412.4 
RDBs 173.7 47.6 95.0 76.4 25.5 – 418.2 
China & others 9,932.2 268.4 10,747.5 1,032.1 – – 21,980.1 
Non-ICA 
Europe 
345.5 – 458.2 72.5 – – 876.2 
African 
governments 
15,278.3 4,124.8 5,692.0 705.2 1,164.7 1,1167.3 28,402.3 
Private 113.5 114.0 7,214.8 – – – 7,442.3 
Total 34,658.8 8,116.8 34,667.5 2,518.8 2,216.1 1,167.3 83,372.3 
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Notes: These figures refer to commitments rather than disbursements. ACG = Arab 
Coordination Group, RDB = regional development banks. 
Source: Infrastructure Consortium for Africa 2016, 89 
A separate report by Deloitte (2015), which deals with recent trends in large construction 
projects valued at over $50 million, tells a broadly similar story. However, it uses a different 
breakdown of expenditure and only deals with newly activated projects. It reveals that transport 
gained ground relative to energy between 2013 and 2015 in terms of the number of projects, 
and accounted for substantially more in terms of the total value of expenditure. Whereas mining 
investment fell back, the oil and gas sector underwent significant growth. The report is also of 
interest for what it reveals about public–private partnerships (PPPs), which the World Bank 
has been especially keen to promote (World Bank 2014). It revealed that between 2013 and 
2015, public investment projects increased from 181 to 205, private projects fell from 127 to 
57, and PPPs increased from 14 to 39. The uptake of PPPs seems, therefore, to have come at 
the expense of private projects rather than public financing. Somewhat surprisingly, PPPs have 
had the greatest purchase in West Africa, followed by Southern Africa (Deloitte 2015, 5–6). 
This data therefore indicates that the progress in implementing PPPs has been incremental as 
well as uneven. 
Table 1.2 Construction projects in 2015 valued at above $50 million 
Type of project Value of projects 
($ million) 
Number Percentage of all 
projects (%) 
Education 131 2 0.66 
Energy and power 95,555 85 28.24 
Healthcare 561 4 1.33 
Manufacturing 2,000 1 0.33 
Mining 39,776 22 7.31 
Oil and gas 81,558 18 5.98 
Real estate 12,522 18 5.98 
Shipping and ports 1,035 1 0.33 
Social development 3,305 12 3.99 
Telecommunications 567 2 0.66 
Transport* 131,664 111 36.88 
Water 6,736 25 8.31 
Total 375,410 301 100 
Re-enchantment with big infrastructure 
Note: * A considerable amount of port development is included within the ‘Transport’ category 
rather than under ‘Shipping and ports’. 
Source: Adapted from Deloitte 2015, 5 
 
This brings us to the question of how far resource extraction is shaping the pattern of 
infrastructural investment. Some of the extractive industries clearly make their own 
investments, but they also depend on connective infrastructure such as ports, roads and 
railways. Diamonds are mostly flown out, but mining equipment has to be brought in the hard 
way (African Development Bank 2010, 10). In the case of oil that is produced away from the 
coastline, there is a preference these days for underground pipelines that are linked to dedicated 
oil terminals at the coast. To that extent, oil does not merely create an enclave effect where it 
is drilled, but also in the locations from where it is shipped. The same applies perforce to natural 
gas. By contrast, other mining operations tend to rely on infrastructure that is shared with other 
users. Historically, one form of subsidy to the mining industry resided in the construction of 
railways followed by the creation of monopolies that forced all transporters onto the tracks. By 
spreading the cost among multiple users, the freight charges to the mining sector were reduced. 
These days, such monopolies are frowned upon, which means that the railways have to attract 
willing customers by offering faster and more reliable services. One argument in favour of 
railways is that they reduce wear and tear on the roads, which ought to benefit those engaged 
in the haulage of other commodities. Whether this is optimal for the mining industry depends 
on the nature of what is being transported and other associated costs. In many parts of the 
world, copper is transported by rail, and it is likely that, all else being equal, this would be the 
preferred mode among mining companies in Central Africa. But because the real cost of road 
maintenance is not borne by those who transport copper, and because the labour of truck-
drivers is so cheap,3 there is presently little incentive to alter existing practices. Aside from 
railways, ease of shipment through the seaports is of fundamental importance to the mining 
industry, especially in this era of containerization. This brings us back to the cost and speed of 
handling through the various ports. 
In practice, the extractive industries carry very different weight in the various regions. This is 
reflected in the design of the transport corridors that the regional economic communities 
(RECs) have been promoting for some years now (Söderbaum and Taylor 2008). In the case of 
East Africa, the discovery of oil and gas deposits has brought an appreciation of the need for 
new pipeline projects, but as of 2015 most of the work was no more than incipient. The main 
focus of the East African Community (EAC) has been on removing trade barriers within the 
designated Single Customs Territory (SCT) and attempting to facilitate regional access to 
global markets. For landlocked countries such as Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, the ports of 
Mombasa and Dar es Salaam are the entry points for petroleum imports (all of which are 
currently transported by road) and manufactured goods (which come largely from Asia). The 
current focus is on making substantial improvements to existing ports as well as constructing 
some entirely new ones; upgrading rail links; and improving the roads along the corridors. 
Given that the EAC has few minerals outside of Tanzania, it cannot be said that either the 
Northern Corridor from Mombasa or the Central Corridor through Dar es Salaam is driven by 
an extractive logic. It is revealing that the most expensive construction projects in 2015, in 
order of importance, were the East African Railway, the new port development at Bagamoyo, 
the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the Djibouti–Ethiopia Railway and the Mombasa–
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Malaba Railway. The only straightforwardly extractive investment was a railway to transport 
potash in northern Ethiopia. 
In West Africa, the picture is more mixed. The Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) has indicated that its priority is to promote ALCO, with a view to exploiting the 
possible agglomeration effects of Africa’s most densely populated zone in a belt that stretches 
along the coastline from Lagos to Accra (World Bank 2009; OECD/SWAC 2017, 134–136). 
There are limited mineral resources along the coastal corridor, and the expectation is that most 
of the traffic will involve goods produced within the region, including manufactures and 
agricultural produce. At present, the most visible item of trade is Nigerian cement, which has 
found a ready market in Ghana. The expansion of the ports that are dotted along the coastline, 
notably at Abidjan, Tema, Lomé and Cotonou, is intended to facilitate access to the global 
market for the Sahelian countries. Burkina Faso depends on the road corridors through Ghana 
and Togo for many of its manufactured imports, whereas the mining industry makes use of the 
Abidjan–Ouagadougou railway. In 2014, when the existing management contract expired, the 
major stake in the operation of the railway was taken on by Pan-African Minerals, which 
announced plans to extend the line to its manganese mine in north-eastern Burkina Faso.4 In 
West Africa, some of the largest infrastructural investments involved extractive industries. Oil 
and gas projects, such as the Nigeria–Algeria pipeline project, accounted for five of the ten 
most expensive projects in the region in 2015. However, the Simandou iron-ore project in 
Guinea topped the list, while a bauxite/alumina project was ranked fifth. The construction of a 
partially new rail link between Niamey (Niger) and Cotonou (Benin), which was assigned to 
Bolloré, is another example of the linkage between mining (in this case uranium) and railway 
investments in the Sahel, although work ground to a halt following a legal challenge in Benin 
in 2015. 
In West–Central Africa, the picture is different again. Here, the overall level of infrastructural 
investment has been considerably smaller, but it has certainly been pursued with a view to 
facilitating mineral exports. The Kribi–Edea railway, which is geared to the development of 
iron-ore and bauxite exports from Cameroon, was the largest project in the region in 2015. 
There has also been major investment in seaports, especially at Kribi. However, the many 
delays to the expansion of the port have meant that the transport corridor to neighbouring 
countries is poorly developed.5 
In Southern Africa, which was the largest recipient of new investment by some margin, there 
has been a much greater focus on power generation, some of which serves the mining industry 
but is clearly also driven by rising consumer demand. By far the largest construction project in 
Southern Africa in 2015, at a cost of $22.5 billion, was the redevelopment of the port of Durban. 
Already the continent’s second-busiest port, Durban hopes to quadruple its capacity in the 
coming years. Part of the rationale is that the copper industries of Zambia and the DRC will 
continue to patronize the port, but it is also intended to cater to South Africa’s own 
requirements. 
Finally, there is much less evidence of an extractive logic at work in North Africa, which 
accounted for only around 10 per cent of all new investments. In 2015, the largest project was 
the Tangier–Casablanca high-speed rail project in Morocco, which is oriented towards 
passenger traffic. The other major investments were concerned with power generation of 
various kinds, including the development of the Nador West Port in Morocco, which is 
connected to plans for a thermal energy project. The other rationale behind this port 
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development is that it will enable Morocco to bid for cargo traffic in the western 
Mediterranean.6 
In general, therefore, we may conclude that infrastructural investments are only partially 
justified with reference to the requirements of the mining industry, whereas the more specific 
needs of the oil and gas sectors are often prioritized. In East Africa, the main transport corridors 
are intended to facilitate the flow of Asian manufactures and petroleum imports, and to increase 
regional trade. In West Africa, the case for ALCO has been advanced on the basis of developing 
the internal market, whereas the corridors that run from the ports to the Sahelian countries are 
intended to facilitate both the import of consumer goods and the export of minerals. In West–
Central Africa and Southern Africa, mining logics play a more significant role. In North Africa, 
however, the extractive industries are confined to a handful of oil and gas projects. Given this 
highly variegated picture, it is clearly very difficult to generalize for the continent as a whole, 
but the overall picture is that ‘internal’ needs – for cheap electricity, faster travel and cheaper 
consumer goods – are at least as important as ‘external’ drivers. In the context of less 
favourable international prices for minerals, one would expect the relative balance of 
investments to shift – as indeed it has in recent years –albeit without significant effect on the 
overall momentum behind infrastructural investments. China’s interests are not confined to the 
extractive industries, and one would expect its broader interest in infrastructure to continue for 
as long as it is able to sustain its own growth trajectory. As for the development banks, they 
exhibit an undiminished enthusiasm for investments in big infrastructure and this is unlikely to 
change any time soon. A retreat from big infrastructure would require a paradigm shift, and 
this is not currently on the horizon. 
Infrastructure and state capacities 
When we consider the impact of all this investment upon state capacities, a fundamental 
distinction needs to be drawn between the ability of African governments to shape the 
developmental agenda and their capacity to complete administrative functions with a modicum 
of efficiency. A moment’s reflection would indicate that these are not necessarily congruent, 
because the assertion of (multi-)state ownership over the project for respacing Africa might 
well be associated with greater bureaucratic confusion. 
As far as the first criterion is concerned, it sometimes seems as if the agenda is being driven by 
external actors and that African governments simply tag along. But much as statist versions of 
development in the 1960s and 1970s were hegemonic, so current versions of development 
through ‘infrastructuring’ are based on a consensus that is shared by all the principal actors – 
ranging from the World Bank, to Bolloré, to African governments themselves. I have already 
indicated that the latter have manifested a high level of commitment by financing much of the 
infrastructure, but it is also noteworthy that these states have retained a considerable measure 
of control over the way in which infrastructure is rolled out and operationalized. An obvious 
place to start is with corridor management, which is a complex field because it necessarily 
involves government agencies across multiple countries as well as non-state agencies operating 
at the regional and national levels. The task of coordinating all of this complexity should not 
be underestimated. 
The corridors themselves are constituted in very different ways. The Walvis Bay Corridor 
Group, which is responsible for four transport corridors, has made a formal attempt to be 
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inclusive. Its members include four Namibian ministries, the Road Authority, the Namibian 
Ports Authority (NAMPORT), the Walvis Bay municipality and six business, logistics and 
transport associations. Non-Namibian companies are permitted an associated status, which is 
indicative of the measure of control that the Namibian state prefers to retain.7 By contrast, 
ALCO was established by the five states along the corridor with the support of the World Bank 
and UNAIDS, and with additional input from ECOWAS, UEMOA, USAID, the Global Fund 
and other international organizations.8 Unusually, AIDS and malaria prevention has shared the 
limelight with trade facilitation, which reflects some donor preferences. Importantly, ALCO 
remains an intergovernmental initiative, with no direct input from the private sector.9 It has, 
however, engaged with the West Africa Trade Hub, which was established as an initiative of 
USAID. Over several years, the Hub generated valuable field data on checkpoints and bribes 
demanded per kilometre along the corridors. Although USAID funding for this work has now 
ceased, the Borderless Alliance continues to provide a forum through which state agencies and 
private businesses can work together to minimize transport delays. 
In East Africa, the pattern is somewhat similar. The Northern Corridor Transit and Transport 
Coordination Authority (NCTTA) is operated by the Ministries of Transport in the member 
countries. The input of the private sector is confined to a Stakeholders Forum that convenes 
from time to time.10 However, TradeMark East Africa (TMEA), a non-profit organization, has 
served as the conduit for much of the donor funding that has gone into the construction of roads 
and one-stop border posts (OSBPs). TMEA has been closely involved in upgrading computer 
systems for Customs and promoting trade facilitation. It also acts as something of a lobbyist 
for the private sector, promoting the interests of corporate actors and small-scale traders alike.11 
The overall pattern, therefore, is one in which state agencies have remained in control, but have 
looked for common ground with non-state actors that have stakes in trade and transport. 
International corporations are playing a critical role in the construction of port facilities, but 
African governments have resisted any move towards wholesale privatization. At Walvis Bay, 
a decision was taken to upgrade the existing port with a large tranche of funding from the 
AfDB, but without any private sector involvement. The solid governance record of the 
Namibian state, and the relative efficiency of the port, made the AfDB more than usually 
accommodating (African Development Bank 2013). In this way, the Walvis Bay port was 
retained firmly within the public domain, although the actual construction was put out to tender. 
In most cases, governments have established port authorities (PAs) that are granted a high 
degree of autonomy and maintain overall regulatory oversight. It is customary to distinguish 
between three models of port management: namely, landlord ports, in which the infrastructure 
(berths, docks and roads) is owned and operated by the PA, while the superstructure (cranes, 
sheds and so on) is owned by private operators; tool ports, in which private companies manage 
the infrastructure and superstructure on behalf of the PA; and service ports, in which the PAs 
remain fully in control of operations (Trujillo and Nombela 1999, 11–12). In a survey of trends 
up to 2010, the AfDB indicated that the landlord model found little favour, and was confined 
to Ghana and Nigeria. Versions of the service port were very common across Africa, but with 
concessions often granted to private companies to manage part of the operations (African 
Development Bank 2010, 82–85). In that way, the PAs managed to retain ownership of the 
                                                 
7 See www.wbcg.com.na/members/our-members.html, accessed 28 December 2017. 
8 See www.corridor-sida.org/?Institutional-arrangement, accessed 28 December 2017. 
9 Interview with Edy K. Anthony, Abidjan–Lagos Corridor Group, Cotonou, 21 August 2017. 
10 See www.ttcanc.org/page.php?id=16, accessed 28 December 2017. 
11 See www.trademarkea.com/who-we-are/our-organisation/, accessed 28 December 2017. 
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hard infrastructure. In recent years, new container terminals have been leased as concessions 
to corporate giants such as Dubai Port World (DPW) and Bolloré.12 
However, governments have also driven hard bargains. A case in point is the port of Djibouti, 
which granted the concession for a new container terminal to DPW before revoking it in 2014.13 
In Tema, a hybrid configuration is unfolding. The current expansion project entails the 
investment of $1.5 billion to construct a port that will be equipped to handle container ships 
that are three times the size of those currently using the facilities.14 The container port is 
operated by Meridian Port Services (MPS), a joint venture between the Ghana Ports and 
Harbours Authority (GPHA) and Meridian Port Holdings, in which APM Terminals (part of 
the Maersk group) and Bolloré are the main shareholders. Therefore, the GPHA has not 
relinquished control; rather, it has sought to remain fully embedded in port management. 
The AfDB attributes governments’ reluctance fully to privatize port operations to their desire 
to use the income from the ports to cross-subsidize other sectors (African Development Bank 
2010, 84). But there is another consideration: namely, in the context of regional integration, 
Customs revenues are attributed to the country of final destination for imports. This comes at 
the expense of the countries that own the ports. In Ghana, a representative of a major 
international organization confided that while the incoming Kufuor government loudly 
trumpeted its plans to improve operations at Tema, the assumption is that the port’s principal 
purpose is to generate revenue. In his view, Tema is, to all intents and purposes, a tool port, 
subordinating operational efficiency to the revenue imperative.15 In many countries, ownership 
is a politically charged issue that ties the hands of government. In Kenya, rumours that the 
authorities planned to privatize the port of Mombasa caused an uproar that led to a hasty retreat 
in 2012. The government subsequently announced that a newly built second container terminal 
would be operated by a private company after a competitive tendering process. In 2016, the 
tendering was itself suspended following legal challenges and claims of questionable dealing, 
as a result of which the Kenya Ports Authority assumed direct control of the terminal.16 
In contrast with the ports, governments exhibit less sensitivity about railways, many of which 
are being constructed and upgraded with external financing and operated by private companies. 
Governments seem to view more efficient railways as crucial elements in improving trade 
flows rather than milch-cows in their own right. Roads are different again in that there is an 
increasing tendency for construction and maintenance to be contracted out to private companies 
that assume responsibility for particular sections. Although there is a proliferation of tollbooths 
along the transport corridors, such as ALCO, these do not, in themselves, generate any financial 
rewards for the state, which can therefore afford to be more sanguine about hiving off de facto 
control. 
Finally, although Customs ostensibly has little to do with big infrastructure, physical 
enlargement of the seaports and the construction of OSBPs are closely associated with upgrades 
to information systems and the respacing of Customs work with donor support. Customs 
                                                 
12 DPW, based in the Emirates but a truly global operator, took over a concession for the existing 
container terminal in Dakar in 2007. It also held the concession at Djibouti port between 2000 and 2011, when 
the arrangement was terminated, as well as concessions in Algiers and Maputo. Bolloré holds a concession at 
Douala and leads a consortium for a terminal at Kribi, which is not yet operational. Other significant players are 
AP Møller (for Walvis Bay, Luanda, Lagos and Tema) and Hutchison (for Dar es Salaam). Bolloré is involved 
at some level in the management of all the major port developments in West Africa. 
13 DPW claims to operate more than sixty terminals on six continents. It has taken the Djibouti 
government to court over this issue. 
14 See www.maersk.com/en/the-maersk-group/about-us/publications/group-annual-
magazine/2015/west-africas-next-generation-ports, accessed 28 December 2017. 
15 Interview with a representative of international organization (name withheld), Accra, 28 August 2017. 
16 I am grateful to Hugh Lamarque for pointing me towards press coverage of this affair. 
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reforms are part of a global trend, and reflect the fact that almost all African countries are 
members of the World Customs Organization (WCO) and have either already joined, or are in 
the process of entering, the World Trade Organization (WTO). This, in itself, presupposes 
compliance with international norms and procedures. Whereas most countries have historically 
been characterized by rather limited integration between government agencies, the shift 
towards variants of single window means that it is possible for various agencies within a single 
country to access the same computer records. This is being strongly driven by an integrated 
border management (IBM) agenda (Siva 2011), but it has implications for other branches of 
the bureaucracy (Nugent 2016). At the same time, IBM is supposed to facilitate the sharing of 
data across borders, which is a challenge because of language differences and entrenched 
institutional cultures. As many countries have migrated to versions of the ASYCUDA 
(Automated System for Customs Data) Customs system, which is championed by UNCTAD, 
revenue authorities are increasingly able to access one another’s entries (Cantens et al. 2010). 
For imports transiting through Mombasa, a single Customs entry is made in the country of final 
destination, which may be Rwanda or Uganda. Along with the rolling out of an electronic cargo 
tracking system (ECTS) in 2017, this circumvents the need for physical inspection of transit 
goods and thereby contributes to an overall reduction in delays. 
This is also a domain in which states are actively seeking to reclaim the agenda. In a number 
of countries, aspects of Customs work – most notably valuation and inspection – were initially 
subcontracted to international companies in the name of greater efficiency (Chalfin 2010, 107–
108, 171–184). At the same time, Customs departments in many countries were restructured 
and folded into semi-autonomous revenue authorities (RAs). There were fourteen of these RAs 
in 2009, mostly of them in Anglophone countries, with more expected to follow (Fjeldstadt 
and Moore 2009, 2). A recent trend has been for RAs to claw back control of valuation from 
private companies and to centralize their activities in the capital city. This restructuring was 
implemented in both Uganda and Ghana in 2017.17 The centralization of Customs operations 
conforms to a larger pattern in which states seek to remain in the driving seat. Given that RAs 
furnish the revenues that enable the rest of the state to function, this has the potential to give 
them a much greater voice within the state bureaucracy. This, in turn, has implications for the 
extractive industries, given a context in which there is much debate about whether mining 
companies are paying their way. 
This brings us to the second question of whether the infrastructural big push is helping to 
enhance the administrative performance of African states. One critique of ‘neoliberal 
governance’ reforms is that they risk creating islands of effectiveness amidst large swathes of 
institutional incoherence. Here I will confine myself to a consideration of performance along 
the transport corridors and the implications for the extractive industries. The re-enchantment 
with railways is relatively recent, and as yet there is insufficient evidence to judge whether 
there has been a significant improvement – although, given the decrepit state of the existing 
networks, one would expect fresh investments to bring rapid returns. I will therefore focus on 
long-distance trucking routes and seaports. In each case, a great deal of donor effort has gone 
into calibrating the effects of infrastructural improvements on transit times – and hence on 
transport costs. The data that is freely available presents a mixed picture. 
The condition of the roads along any corridor clearly affects journey times, but one of the 
greatest impediments has been the quality of the border crossings, where literally creaking 
infrastructure (degraded roads and bridges) and duplicated border formalities have led to 
lengthy delays along the main trucking routes. A case in point is the section of corridor between 
the Congolese/Zambian Copperbelt and the port of Durban. The crossing from the DRC to 
                                                 
17 These observations are based on fieldwork in Ghana in August 2017 and Uganda (with Isabella Soi) in 
October 2017. 
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Zambia Kasumbalesa is notoriously slow, and it has been repeatedly blockaded by drivers 
protesting against chronic insecurity. There have also been acute delays at Chirundu on the 
Zambia/Zimbabwe border and at the Beit Bridge crossing between Zimbabwe and South 
Africa. According to one estimate, a third of the total transport time along the corridor was 
spent waiting at the border crossings (Curtis 2009, xv). In an effort to address this serious 
problem, the governments of Zimbabwe and Zambia decided to construct an OSBP at 
Chirundu, an initiative that was subsequently adopted by COMESA. The OSBP, which was 
the first of its kind in sub-Saharan Africa, became partly operational in 2007 and was formally 
opened in 2009. At that point, it took a vehicle thirty-nine hours to transit northbound and 
fourteen hours to move southbound through Chirundu (Curtis 2009, 20). At Beit Bridge, the 
equivalent delays were thirty-four  and eleven hours, respectively. Assessments indicated that 
some of the most stubborn challenges related to coordinating the activities of around twenty 
government agencies on the two sides of the border, sharing Customs information and 
persuading officials that greater efficiency was in their best interests (OECD/WTO 2011, 7–
8). After several years, the flow of traffic through Chirundu improved, with copper accounting 
for most of the southbound traffic. However, in 2017, there were reports of vehicles stranded 
at Chirundu for days amidst allegations of corruption and bureaucratic obstacles. In West 
Africa, a series of OSBPs has been constructed along ALCO, but they are standing empty 
because officials on either side have not been able to agree on the modalities for opening them. 
There have been some improvements to crossing times since 2014, but from a very low base: 
for example, the average time for a truck crossing from Kraké in Benin to Seme in Nigeria fell 
from sixty-three to twenty-seven hours between 2014 and 2016 (ALCO 2016). As in Chirundu, 
border officials who have not bought into the official rhetoric on the advantages of the 
frictionless border have found ways to slow down the system. 
The greatest successes have been chalked up in East Africa, along the Northern and Central 
Corridors, which, as I have indicated, are of marginal significance to the extractive industries. 
The lessons here are that the involvement of external actors in the design of OSBPs may 
facilitate coordination between state agencies. TMEA has been involved in the construction of 
thirteen OSBPs, ten of which are now complete. The landlocked states of Rwanda and Uganda 
have displayed particular interest in creating purpose-built facilities and rendering clearance 
procedures as smooth as possible, whereas in Kenya there has been much greater institutional 
competition and bureaucratic inertia. Along the Northern Corridor, the Malaba and Busia 
OSBPs are operational on a twenty-four-hour basis, but the inherited infrastructure and 
institutional communications on the Kenyan side are noticeably less conducive to making rapid 
strides. Where the OSBPs have become fully operational, the results have been significant. At 
Busia, the long queues of trucks that were apparent in 2014 had largely disappeared by 2017. 
In 2011, the average crossing time at Busia was 14.3 hours, but this had been reduced to just 
3.6 hours by 2017 (Soi and Nugent 2017, 546–547). An even more dramatic improvement was 
recorded at the Mutukula OSBP on the Uganda/Tanzania border, which was formally opened 
by the two countries’ presidents in November 2017. 
At the ports, the picture is somewhat similar. Many of the PAs have been accused of chronic 
inefficiency and everyday corruption, and they have come under government pressure to boost 
their performance. These days, most PAs post online statistics on volumes of cargo handled 
and waiting times, so progress may be monitored and port trajectories compared. A number of 
ports have produced evidence to back up their claims of improved performance. The website 
of the port of Djibouti, for example, claims an increase in container traffic from 424.9 thousand 
TEUs in 2010 to 910.2 thousand TEUs in 2015. Over the same period, it reported that non-
containerized traffic almost doubled.18 The port of Mombasa similarly claims a substantial 
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increase in container traffic – from 770.8 thousand TEUs in 2011 to 1.1 million TEUs in 2015.19 
While the advocates of state withdrawal from port management maintain that the current 
arrangements remain sub-optimal, the evidence of incremental improvement means it is easier 
to make the case for continued public control. Clearly, though, qualitative shifts in the 
performance of seaports and OSBPs alike will depend on transforming institutional cultures – 
and this still has some way to go. While the RAs have seen some significant changes in the 
way staff relate to their work in a country like Uganda or Ghana, it is the most laggardly agency 
that typically dictates the pace at the ports and the OSBPs. Moreover, the experience of many 
of the OSBPs is that better flows at the border crossings are often accompanied by a 
proliferation of informal checkpoints – erected by the police and a range of other state agents 
– along other sections of the corridors. This has the effect of simply transplanting the transport 
delays to different locations. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that there is a risk of African countries overreaching themselves 
at a time when the global economic environment is no longer particularly favourable. Although 
regional integration initiatives are proceeding apace, it is difficult to point to a coordinated 
regional strategy when it comes to big infrastructure. On a more modest scale than in South-
East Asia, but following a similar zero-sum logic, governments seek to entice trade to their 
ports to the detriment of their neighbours (Fau 2014, 58–63). Some irony resides in the fact 
that, while the coastal states are making the greatest investments, the landlocked countries are 
incurring fewer risks and reaping more of the benefits as a consequence. On the one hand, as 
part of the creation of free-trade zones and the imposition of a Common External Tariff (CET), 
the poorer landlocked countries receive manufactured goods at lower costs as well as Customs 
revenue on imported goods. On the other hand, the competitive investment in ports and 
railways enables them to shop around for the best deals, potentially leaving the littoral states 
high and dry. As I have indicated, most of the copper from Zambia and southern DRC travels 
to the seaports by road. The expansion of the port of Durban is intended to consolidate the 
niche that it has carved for itself. However, at the same time, the bridging of the Zambezi River 
and the promotion of the Walvis Bay–Ndola–Lubumbashi Development Corridor, as it is now 
called, is intended to provide an alternative outlet to the sea. The governments of Zambia, the 
DRC and Namibia have formally committed themselves to promoting this corridor as a conduit 
for materials used in mining and for the export of copper.20 Yet, the Congolese authorities have 
also been receptive to plans to develop the Angolan port of Lobito as an alternative outlet for 
their exports. Therefore, three expensive port developments are pinning their hopes on 
assumptions about the direction that copper exports will take in the future. Similarly, the ports 
of Abidjan, Tema, Lomé and Cotonou are formally partners in ALCO, but they stand in a 
competitive relationship with respect to the transit trade with the landlocked countries of the 
Sahel. 
Another striking example is LAPSSET (the Lamu Port–South Sudan–Ethiopia Transport 
Corridor), which Kenya has been aggressively promoting. It is supposed to cater to the 
landlocked countries of Uganda, South Sudan and Ethiopia and to promote development in the 
poorest parts of northern Kenya by means of rail, road, air and fibre-optic-cable links. The 
centrepiece is a new port at Lamu that a Chinese company is constructing. However, Ethiopia 
has already chosen to prioritize a new rail link to the port of Djibouti, possibly because it is 
less susceptible to terrorist attacks by al-Shabaab. To compound matters, the projected oil 
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www.kpa.co.ke/InforCenter/Performance%20Reports/KPA%20Annual%20Report%202015
%20(without%20photos).pdf, accessed 28 December 2017. 
20 See www.wbcg.com.na/news-info/news/detail//developing-the-walvis-bay-ndola-
lubumbashi-development-corridor/home-page.html, accessed 28 December 2017. 
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pipeline from northern Uganda to Lamu has been abandoned in favour of a route to the port of 
Tanga in Tanzania. With the latter country also planning to open a new port at Bagamoyo, 
Kenya’s heavy investment in seaports suddenly seems to be a dangerous gamble. The 
downstream consequences of overreach are apparent when one recalls that African 
governments channel many of their scarce resources into infrastructural development. Indeed, 
one recent study suggests that African governments fund as much as 65 per cent of 
infrastructural expenditure from the general budget (Guttman et al. 2015, 3). This inevitably 
means that resources are diverted away from competing priorities, such as urban water supply 
and power generation, which may be more pressing needs. Kribi has often looked like turning 
into a white elephant, although it will probably come to fruition – albeit at great expense and 
long behind schedule – because of its strategic importance to neighbouring countries. However, 
the port of Lamu seems unlikely ever to pay its way, and many other infrastructural investments 
may go the same way in the future. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have addressed two fundamental issues concerning infrastructural investment 
in Africa. First, I have mapped the changing patterns as well as the principal actors, with a view 
to assessing how far the needs of the extractive industries are driving and shaping investment 
flows. It is striking that investments in big infrastructure – especially in seaports and railways 
– are back in vogue amongst donors, investors and African governments alike. One significant 
finding is that African governments finance much of the infrastructure both directly and 
through loans. Another is that, whereas the oil and gas sector has tended to benefit from 
investments in pipelines across the regions, the ability of mining to shape infrastructural 
provision has varied considerably. Some transport corridors, most notably in East Africa and 
coastal West Africa, are geared towards facilitating the flow of imported and domestically 
produced commodities rather than easing the export of minerals. It is really only in Southern 
Africa and parts of West Africa that infrastructural investments are driven by mining logic. 
Second, I have weighed up the implications of the infrastructural ‘big push’ for the ability of 
African governments to shape the agenda and for the capacity of bureaucracies to undertake 
their (partially reconfigured) functions. African governments have retained a surprising degree 
of control over the process, as is reflected in the stubborn persistence of PAs and public 
management of the transport corridors. Through a closer examination of OSBPs and seaports, 
I have concluded that the record of bureaucratic implementation remains patchy. Although 
performance indicators mostly point to demonstrable improvements, the patterns are highly 
uneven, especially with respect to OSBPs. The results have been encouraging where there has 
been significant harmonization of information systems and procedures, and where a range of 
state agencies has displayed commitment to the process of reform. East Africa is forging ahead 
by comparison with the other regions. However, across much of the continent, the big 
infrastructure is still waiting for the rest of the institutional bandwagon to catch up. Be that as 
it may, I have found little evidence to support the claim that ‘infrastructuring’ has contributed 
to greater institutional coherence, even though a bewildering array of actors is now involved. 
Finally, I have concluded this chapter on a cautionary note. Precisely because infrastructural 
investments are not driven by a purely extractive logic, they are more likely to proceed apace 
irrespective of lower commodity prices. But herein lies a danger that African countries will 
overreach themselves and be saddled with a series of white elephants that will be held under 
state ownership. It would be profoundly ironic if history ended up repeating itself. 
Paul Nugent 
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